Rising High in the Reisinger

MARION MICHIELSEN

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Marion Michielsen (1985) holds a Master in Law from the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. She lives in Stockholm with her son Oscar. Marion is a professional bridge player. She won three junior titles and won the European Championships for women thrice (2007, 2014 & 2015, with Meike Wortel). In 2014 she also triumphed both in the Women Teams (with Meike Wortel) and in the Mixed Teams (with Zia Mahmood) at the World Bridge Series (Sanya, China). In 2022 she won the Women Teams event (with Cecila Rimstedt) at the World Bridge Series in Wroclaw. She won bronze at the 2025 Bermuda Bowl with the Swedish open team.

It had already been decided in advance that the NABC in San Francisco would be our last tournament with Team Connie Goldberg. After several years of playing with this team, new adventures await all of us starting in 2026.

A final tournament brings mixed emotions. We’ve played together with great pleasure for several years, and we part ways without any hard feelings. On the one hand, you want to do everything possible to make it a beautiful final week; on the other hand, there’s inevitably less team spirit than usual.

The Fall NABC always begins with the Soloway. We qualified for the round of 32 without difficulty, but then lost by 4 IMPs to Team Nitabach. The four days that follow contain no National team events; we took two days off and played two days in the Regionals (affectionately called “the basement” by the pros). The days off allowed us to start the final weekend — the Reisinger — fully recharged.

The Reisinger is one of the highlights of the year for me. I love the format, BoardaMatch, which suits us extremely well. Our strong club system is designed to place the strong hand as declarer, often with very little known about it. And the playing style — paying attention to every single trick — fits us perfectly. In recent years we have always reached the final without difficulty, with our best result being fourth place last year. Naturally, the goal was to improve on that.

Last year I felt as if I had wandered into a Wild West movie that had little to do with bridge, but this year everything felt much more normal. There were a few more doubled partscores. That was, I think, where we earned most of our points — not by doubling ourselves, but by being doubled! Especially at the other table, contract after contract was met by a double, often completely impossible to defeat.

This deal was a good example. East has 6 points and no reason to believe that 2︎ will make, nor that 3︎ will go down. Yet he couldn’t resist doubling. The contract made with an overtrick. At the other table the same contract was played undoubled.

One of the most difficult — and, in my opinion, most enjoyable — aspects of pairs or BAM is defending 1NT. There are usually many possibilities, and you must choose between suits and even between specific cards within those suits.

Cullin led the ︎9. South had denied a fourcard spade suit, but in our methods the 9 shows 9x, 9xx, or a sequence headed by 98. Dummy held the 8, and from 9xxx he would have led the secondhighest, so South had to have four spades. It is important to trust your own partnership agreements rather than relying on the opponents’ bidding.

I ducked the first spade to avoid giving declarer an easy entry to hand. Declarer cashed the ︎A and led a heart to the queen. Cullin still believed I had four spades and returned another spade. Declarer won the ace and led a spade to my king.

It seemed to me that partner, with four diamonds, would have been more likely to lead or return the suit, so declarer was probably 4432. And with xx or Jx of diamonds, he would more likely have shown his fourcard spade suit, I thought. A diamond return risks giving up a trick if declarer has Jxx. You can try a small one, hoping declarer won’t insert the jack, but from K10xx or Q10xx the correct card is an honour, so declarer might try the jack. Not to mention the case where he has J10.

So I switched to clubs. Partner won and returned the ︎10. Declarer ducked, and I continued clubs to the ace. Now declarer was in trouble. He had no entry to hand and had to cash the remaining spades. Dummy also had to discard something. As the cards lay, discarding a club or a heart from dummy was worst for us. The clubs were blocked, and I would have to discard the ︎J to avoid being thrown in. Since declarer had played hearts to the queen (with Q10xx you usually lead toward the 10), I was planning to do that anyway, but it was pleasant that he discarded a diamond, essentially giving up, and conceded one down. At the other table the contract was exactly made.

It is not only in 1NT contracts that you must decide where to place your bets. One of the hardest things is judging how many tricks you should aim for and how much risk you should take. Do you go for the maximum with maximum risk, or choose a safer line with less potential gain? Michael Rosenberg once said that in his experience you should always go for the maximum. Rosenberg is, in my opinion, one of the players with the deepest theoretical understanding of the game, so that voice is always in the back of my mind. The following deal was one of those where you have no idea how many tricks you should try to take:

West led the ︎J. I won in hand and led the ︎J, covered and won in dummy. First things first: a spade to the king, which held (righthand opponent played the 4, left the 9 — they play highlow even). Another heart finesse, which also held. So far so good. I cashed the ︎A; RHO followed.

What do you pitch from hand?

If you play for the spades, you have a chance to take twelve tricks. You cannot take more than that on this hand. But then you must give up on the clubs, or decide not to cash all the hearts immediately and instead play spades and hope for the best. You can also discard some spades and play for clubs, but you must guess the suit correctly first.

I thought the opponents’ spade cards suggested the suit was not 33, and therefore I could not take twelve tricks. So I could afford to lose a diamond and a spade on the early hearts. RHO discarded ︎432 and then the ︎3. If he was signalling honestly, LHO had the ︎K. I discarded another spade and led a club to the 10. West won the king and cashed the diamonds. The clubs were now good, and I had eleven tricks. At the other table declarer went allin on the spades and took only ten.

At BAM, nonvulnerable is like waving a red flag to a bull. To go down only cost 50 per trick, so as long as you’re not doubled you can afford a few tricks if the opponents are likely to make their partscore. It happens regularly that everyone stretches a little, even when their cards don’t really justify it. This deal was a good example:

South’s 3︎ bid was a classic BAM action. Anyone can calculate that it is unlikely to end well, but he simply couldn’t resist. West might have bid 4︎ anyway, but now he was more or less pushed into it. Four hearts is a dreadful contract, but on this layout it actually makes. Why North bid 4︎ is beyond me; he certainly couldn’t expect not to be doubled. A tasty +500 came our way, and at the other table EastWest stopped in 3︎.

I like starting the day with an exciting deal. Don’t be afraid, go allin when needed, and see which way the wind blows. In the final, I was immediately rewarded:

South led a club, and I drew three rounds of trumps before leading the ︎Q from hand. Technically, it is better to play spades first and judge from the spade position whether it is more likely that North has a singleton ︎K or South holds the king. Now that the opponents knew I had only six hearts for my 4︎ bid, it was also likely that I had five diamonds, and South should not cover even with Kx. Still, in practice it felt better to draw trumps quickly and then lead the ︎Q from hand. South did not cover, I played the ace, and +650 was the reward. At the other table, 6︎ went down one.

After the first session of the final, we were in first place. In the Reisinger, everyone plays the same boards at the same time, which means you can check scores with your teammates between rounds, and running scores are displayed. Throughout the entire second session, we remained in first place. With two rounds to go, we were more than 2.5 points ahead of second place (the maximum per round is 3), a comfortable lead. With one round to go, the lead was still more than 1.5 points. That meant that if we scored an average result in the final round, we would be certain of winning.

The first board of the last round:

On the first board I picked up a rather uninteresting collection. Bobby Levin opened 2︎, and after a few minutes the tray came back with 3︎ (nonforcing), and everyone passed. Levin congratulated himself for not bidding again after (presumably) partner’s hesitation. In the final we had already called the director several times because of unethical actions by our opponents. We almost never call the director, but it seemed as if the final brought out the worst in our opponents, and several times it became too much even for us.

The Americans often open twolevel with a fourcard side major, which they can clarify via 2NT. That may all be theoretically fine, but even then I would never dream of opening 2︎ with these suits.

The last round could not have started better: 3︎ made +4 (no club lead), but that was irrelevant because I assumed they would bid 4︎ at the other table — which they did. The first point was secured. Half a point more, and victory was guaranteed.

The next deal I picked up was: ︎ Q 9 2 ︎ K 6 2 ︎ 9 7 6 5 ︎ A Q 8. With all vulnerable, I passed in first seat, and Cullin opened 1︎ (12–14 NT or any 4441 12–16 or a 5+ minor with a fourcard major, 10–15). Righthand opponent overcalled 1NT. I doubled. I certainly had enough values for it, but I was not convinced it was the right action.

Lefthand opponent will often run, after which we play takeout doubles. I must then hope partner doubles something — which he will almost never do with a threecard suit. And with a minimum hand opposite my passed hand perhaps not even with a doubleton if it’s a major. Otherwise, I must pass it out myself and hope that that contract goes down more (or at least as much) than 1NT does.

After my double, LHO redoubled, showing a onesuiter. RHO bid 2︎ (passorcorrect), so I passed. LHO bid 2︎, which was passed around to me. I had little choice but to pass (you can try double, but that is takeout, and with this hand you do not want to play at the threelevel yourself). The whole situation felt wrong — and it was.

LHO’s scattered values were just enough to ensure the contract went down only one. We can make 3︎ and 2NT. RHO did not have an automatic 1NT overcall at this vulnerability, so this deal was almost certainly a zero. The full deal:

Roll up our sleeves, on to the next board.

The first hurdle was cleared: reaching 4︎. During the play I got a clear picture of the distribution and the location of the honours in clubs and hearts for EastWest. I eventually led the ︎J. West held ︎Q10x, so it no longer mattered, but +420 was an excellent result and normally one we would not expect to lose.

The board was indeed a wash, and with that our victory in the Reisinger was secured.

This made PerOla Cullin and me the first players living in Sweden ever to win a major NABC event (Reisinger/Spingold/Vanderbilt/Soloway). A more beautiful ending to our years with Team Goldberg would have been impossible. My phone was buzzing nonstop for three days with congratulations, and I still have a big smile on my face when I think back to San Francisco.

Afterthought

Only later did I discover that with one round to go, our lead was not “more than 1.5 points” but only 1.46. It was thanks to Douglas Doub that Team Edmonds (with Brink–Drijver) did not score the full 3 points in the final round. On the first board this round (see diagram earlier in this article), he had to find an opening lead against 6︎ as South, holding:

︎ K Q 10 ︎ 8 7 2 ︎ 9 3 ︎ K 10 6 5 3. The auction:

Although a singleton club had been shown, Doub still led that suit. Presumably he thought: It’s BAM — let’s take that one trick quickly. It turned out to be two.