This article was originally published in , vol. 8, nr. 3, April/May 1997

Three Queens                         by Larry Cohen Larry Cohen 
-
The 1997 Vanderbilt featured an unusually large number of major-swing deals. Not just swings in which one side bid game, and the other didn’t, where only 10 imps might be at stake. In this match, there were swings, often based on the position of one card, where upwards of 25 imps swung!

Three deals presented later in this article will all involve double-digit swings based on the location of a queen. However, any report on the 1997 Vanderbilt would not be complete without the following "Bonus" deal.

If you haven’t seen this deal yet, you’re in for a treat. Try holding the West cards on Board 9, where you are vulnerable against not:

K 9 8 6 5  A K Q  K J 9 5 2

The bidding goes: Pass, Pass, 2 to you. "What is 2," you ask?

You are shocked to find out that it is strong and forcing! It shows either a strong-two in diamonds, or 20-21 balanced. I’m imposing on you that you pass for now, and LHO systemically reponds 2, waiting. Opener rebids 2 which is natural, showing a strong two-bid in diamonds with spades on the side. Like it or not, I again impose pass on you.

LHO bids 3, an artificial "second negative." Lo and behold, your partner doubles 3! What is going on here? You check the backs of your cards, and plan you strategy.

RHO continues with 3, and what is your plan?

It really comes down to psychology. Don’t you want to buy the hand in some club contract? If partner has as little as AQxxx of clubs you might have a slam. Unless partner has xxx in spades you rate to have twelve tricks.

If you bide your time and bid only 4 ("walking the hand") your LHO bids 4! Now you can suspect that partner has a spade VOID and think in terms of a GRAND slam. Against a strong two-bid! Well, let’s take a look at the entire deal:
 

- 
  N/EW Q 10 7 4 
8 4 
9 7 5 4 
7 6 3
  K 8 6 5 
  A K Q 
 
  K J 9 5 2

10 9 7 5 3 2 
J 10 
A Q 10 8 4
e A J 3 2 
J 6 
A K Q 8 6 3 2 
-
 
- 
Table I- 
 
 
 
 
 
  

Table II

- 
WEST --- 
Cayne 
- 
Pass 
Pass 
5 
Pass! 

WEST 
Boyd 
- 
1 
4 
Pass 
 

- 
NORTH -- 
Goldman 
Pass  
2 
3 
5 
 

NORTH 
Passell 
Pass 
Pass 
5 
Pass

- 
EAST ---  
Burger 
Pass 
Pass 
Double 
Pass 
 

EAST 
Robinson 
Pass 
2 
Double 
 

- 
SOUTH 
Soloway 
2 
2 
3 
Pass 
 

SOUTH 
Seamon 
1 
2 
Pass

 
At table I, Cayne never got to hear North show spade support, so perhaps he was concerned that he could have two spade losers. However, his view to pass out 5 seems quite pessimistic. He led a high heart and when dummy hit he knew his partner was void in spades. He gave Burger a spade ruff, got back in with another heart and gave another spade ruff. The spade king still had to score, for a very disappointing +150.

Boyd-Robinson , at table II, also failed to realize the potential of the East-West cards, but they still gained 8 imps by doubling 5 , and also beating it three.

Notice that East-West have a grand slam in clubs or hearts! How often do you see a grand slam when the opponents open a strong two-bid?

The first "queen" deal was a nightmare for Michael Seamon of the Cayne team:
 

- 
  N/both K J 8 5 

A J 9 8 7 4 2 
4
  Q 7 6 
  J 9 5 4 
  10 3 
  K J 10 3
A 9 4 3 
A 7 6 3 2 
Q 6 
Q 2
e 10 2 
K Q 10 
K 5 
A 9 8 7 6 5
 
- 
WEST --- 
Boyd   
 
2 
Pass 
 
 
 
- 
NORTH -.  
Passell 
Pass 
3 
Pass
- 
EAST ---  
Robinson 
2
Pass 
Pass 

*Flannery

- 
SOUTH 
Seamon 
Pass 
3NT 
 
 
West led a heart to the ace and a heart was returned. How should Seamon play the diamond suit? He figured East for nine cards in the majors, and perhaps he could get a feel for the club suit before guessing diamonds. He played 9 from hand, won by West’s ten. Another heart was played and Seamon laid down the A, low, spade, queen. What could he tell? Not much. He played the K and a diamond to the ten and …. He called for dummy’s jack. East won the queen, and the defence had the rest of the tricks; down five! Minus 500 was a 15-imp loss, since Soloway-Goldman guessed the Q in 3NT at the other table. There, East opened 1, South overcalled 2, West raised to 2, North bid 3 and South bid 3NT. On that auction there was no reason to play the opening bidder for a singleton diamond (he might have competed to 3 holding a stiff diamond) and the game was duly scored.

In the second quarter this constructive bidding problem arose:
 

- 
Dealer 
 
(Favourable Vulnerability)
5 3 
K Q 7 6 3 
9 4 
K Q 10 7
A K 10 
A J 
A K J 10 6 5 
A 6
e
 
 
Both 7 and 7NT are reasonable contracts. In hearts, as long as they are not five-one, you have lots of extra chances. You have twelve top tricks, and can try to ruff out the diamond queen, and then fall back on some sort of squeeze, or at worst a finesse for the club jack. In 7NT you also have lots of ways to combine your chances for thirteen tricks.

At one table Goldman opened the West-hand 1. You’d think that he and Soloway would reach seven after this start, but they had a bit of Blackwood confusion and settled in 6NT making all thirteen tricks.

At the other table Cayne Burger had a confusing auction to end in 7. That contract, at least, is pretty straight-forward. Either the diamonds come in, or they don’t. Well, do you know how to play A K J 10 6 5 opposite 9 4 ? I hope you didn’t lead low to the ace and then finesse on the next round. It’s wrong to guard against a singleton queen offside, because a singleton 2, 3, 7, or 8 is four times as likely. You should take a first-round finesse, and you would be rewarded since the diamonds were indeed four-one with the queen onside. Inexplicably (perhaps he was upset to be in diamonds) Cayne played the ace on the first round and went down one to lose 14 imps instead of gaining 9.

In the third quarter, Passell-Seamon, for the Cayne team, reached this swashbuckling slam in an attempt to close a 50-imp deficit:
 

- 
  S/none Q J 9 7 
K J 10 9 4 3 
K 7 4 
-
  K 8 6 
 
  J 8 
  A Q 10 9 8 5 2
5 4 3 2 
8 7 5 2 
A 6 
6 4 3
e A 10 
A 6 
Q 10 9 5 3 2 
K J 7
 
- 
SOUTH  -.  
Passell 
1NT(15-17) 
4 
5 
Pass
--------- 
 

(3)

- 
NORTH  
Seamon 
4
5** 
6 

*transfer 

**exclusion  
Keycard 
Blackwood

 
West had a difficult lead to make and chose a spade. He must have been upset when the queen held in dummy, but it turns out this was much better than leading a red suit! How should Passell play the trumps? Because of the club preempt the heart length rated to be with East. Passell could pick up Qxx, Qx, or singleton queen with East by floating dummy’s jack. He could pick up those same holdings with West by leading low to the ace. Right or wrong (certainly wrong on this deal!) he chose to lead dummy’s heart jack and he let it ride to West’s bare queen. This led to a heartbreaking down one.

In the other room North declared 4 and could have been defeated. The defence led a club through the king-jack and declarer ruffed. He also finessed into the preemptor’s singleton Q and now West was in, looking at:
 

- 
  K 8 6 
 
  J 8 
  A 10 9 8 5 2
e A 10 

Q 10 9 5 3 2 
K 7
 
 
Had he continued clubs, say with the ace, declarer would have ruffed in hand, and now we’d be down to the same number of trumps as East. Now a trump to the ace, and declarer can’t get back to his hand to draw East’s trumps. Say he plays diamonds. The defence wins the second round (the first round if declarer plays his king) and persists with clubs. Now declarer is helpless. If he leads spades de defence taps him to set up a second trump trick. If he runs diamonds, East ruffs and plays a spade, also for down one.

However, West, Alan Sontag, chose to exit with the K, and declarer had an easy eleven tricks for an 11-imp gain.

In the fourth quarter, the trailing Cayne team bid another grand slam missing a key queen, and the finesse lost. This created yet another huge swing, since the other team was in a small slam.

When the dust had settled, the Schwartz team (Richie Schwartz-Mark Lair, Paul Soloway-Bobby Goldman, Peter Boyd-Steve Robinson) had queened their opponents by 27 imps. The deals in this article alone swung about 100 imps, all in the direction of the winners.


  To IMP Bridge Index