This article first appeared in  vol. 9, nr. 3, May 1998.

Culbertson Dissected        Part 1/4: The Honor Trick  
by Jules van Ogtrop
 
Culbertson team  Who was Ely Culbertson? To the younger generation his name may only be familiar as an indication on the convention card of some elderly couple. They may not be aware of the fact that he was an iron dictator who, from his U.S. headquarters, in the thirties and forties, promulgated his laws which prescribed how one ought to play, and especially, how to bid. 

Did he deserve the enormous awe in which he was held by our parents and grandparents? That's what we will try to determine in this four-part series on the basis of a record of the 300-board match played in 1933 by him and his wife, Josephine, with their respective partners Theodore Lightner and Michael Gottlieb. They faced a representative English squad, selected by a committee of bridge writers. The names of the selected players, Lt. Col. Henry Beasley, Lady Doris Rhodes, Sir Guy Domville, Graham F. Mathieson, G. Morris, and P.V. Tabbush, don't mean anything to us today, but at the time they were regarded as the cream of the English bridge crop. Consequently, the match virtually assumed the status of a world championship. 

Culbertson team, 1933. Left to Right: Michael Gottlieb, Josephine Culbertson, Ely Culbertson, Theodore Lightner.
-
After falling behind in the early going, the Americans eventually managed to win by a substantial margin.*  And that's a good thing too, for else the selfsatisfied Culbertson wouldn't have bothered to keep an exhaustive record of the match, and much bridge material of historical significance would have been lost. (Contract Bridge Championship of 1933, complete hands reviewed and explained by Ely Culbertson, News Chronicle).

What was the level of the top players in those days? The play and defense were of reasonable calibre. Bidding, on the other hand, was primitive and hit-and-miss in nature, even though already then Culbertson proclaimed his system to be the gospel.
So as not to devalue the result of the match, he described all his opponents as 'fine players' (despite the occasional jibe), but, as he pronounced with great pride, the match was won owing to his superior bidding system. As we shall see, that was far from true. Too often, poor results were obtained - curiously, not through lack of bidding discipline, but rather, through too tight a straightjacket in which one could hardly move.

The value of a hand was expressed in terms of 'honor tricks':
 

1/2 H.T.  

1 H.T.-----  

11/2 H.T.  

2 H.T.

Kx, QJx, or Qx in two different suits 

A, KQx, or Kx and Qx in two different suits 

AQ, AJ10, KQ10 

AK

-
One was allowed to assign plus values to scattered honors. Minimum opening values were 21/2 H.T. (3 H.T. if vulnerable) and a response in a new suit, or a simple overcall, required 11/2 H.T. Extra tricks were assigned for length in one's own suit or for support for partner's suit. In addition, the following guidelines applied (although one was allowed to deviate in an emergency):

1. Open and respond only with a biddable suit - at least KQ10x, Kxxxx or QJxxx, any six-card suit;
2. Don't bid notrumps if you have a biddable suit;
3. Partner's response in a new suit is not forcing; opener requires extra values to rebid;
4. All two-level openings are gameforcing;
5. 4NT is a slam invitation and promises three aces, or two aces plus the king in a bid suit.

With some regularity, a suit with some picture cards was bid while a longer suit lacking the required honors remained unbid. As a consequence, one did learn something about the highcard strength of partner's hand,  but his distribution was shrouded in mystery. This series of articles presents a rather haphazard selection of deals from the famous match in which the bidding system was responsible for the ensuing disasters. In some cases, although teetering on the brink, total disaster was narrowly avoided.

On the deal below, Morris (West) opened with 1NT, after which his partner, Tabbush, showing little enterprise, couldn't think of anything better than 2. And that was that: making four and missing a game. Behold the auction by Culbertson and Lightner at the other table:
 

West/both 7 4 2 
9 4 
K 9 5 
J 9 5 4 2
  WEST 
  Culbertson 
  Pass(!) 
  2(!) 
  3NT 
  Pass
NORTH 
Beasley 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass
EAST 
Lightner 
1 
3(!) 
4
SOUTH 
Domville 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass
Q 9 6 3 
A J 3 
A J 2 
A 7 3
K J 
Q 10 7 6 5 2 
Q 7 
Q 10 6
- A 10 8 5 
K 8 
10 8 6 4 3 
K 8
 
 4 was made exactly and so they had landed on their feet, but don't ask how! It's inconceivable that 'table action' didn't play a significant role. Apparently, Lightner surmised that Culbertson had a whale of a hand, despite his original pass with sixteen points. To me, it seems like an auction one can ask to be reviewed, including the same intonation and gestures!
Incidentally, it shows how strongly opposed Culbertson was to opening 1NT without a biddable suit.** In his commentary he dryly remarked: "Once I supported him he decided to move towards game after all."

The unbiddable major suits were often the poor cousins of the bidding system, as these two examples show.
 

S/EW 
 
A J 7 4 

K J 9 4 3 2 
10 7
  WEST 
  Morris 

  Pass 
  Pass 
  Pass

NORTH 
Josephine 

1 
3NT

EAST 
Domville 

Pass 
Pass

SOUTH 
Gottlieb 
Pass 
2NT 
Pass
Q 9 
Q 7 5 
10 7 5 
A J 8 6 4
K 3 2 
K 10 9 4 3 2 
Q 8 
9 2
- 10 8 6 5 
J 8 6 
A 6 
K Q 3 2
 
3NT, of course, has no play following a heart lead, but understandably, Morris led a club. Later, when Gottlieb didn't finesse in diamonds, and against the odds dropped the Q, the contract rolled home with two overtricks because the opponents experienced discarding problems.
At the other table, the British bid and made the good 4-contract - a game in a suit which, according to Culbertson, wasn't biddable. He accepted the lucky result in 3NT without further comment, as it didn't fit into his system.
 
E/EW K 10 7 
K 9 8 7 4 

6 5 4 3
  WEST 
  Culbertson 
  - 
  2 
  3 
  4
NORTH 
Beasley 
- 
2 
3 
Pass
EAST 
Lightner 
1 
Pass 
3NT 
Pass
SOUTH 
Domville 
1 
Pass 
Double 
Pass
J 5 4 2 

Q 7 6 3 
A Q 9 7
Q 8 6 3 
A 3 
A K J 9 5 
J 10
- A 9 
Q J 10 5 2 
10 9 2 
K 8 2
 
 In 4, Lightner made five, just like at the other table, though there game had been reached. That kind of thing can happen, but it is rather remarkable that Culbertson had no comment to make, even though, a) 4 was an excellent contract, which the gentlemen weren't allowed to bid, however, on account of the lack of quality of their four-card spade suits. b) Culbertson had run out of his partner's 3NT, doubled, which would have been made with an overtrick. c) Gottlieb could have set 5 by leading A, other spade, spade ruff.

 Often, one didn't have the foggiest idea of the strength of a bid.
 

E/NS 10 8 7 4 
A 9 
K Q 6 5 2 
9 8
  WEST 
  Morris 
 
  Pass 
  Pass 
  Pass
NORTH 
Josephine 
- 
1 
2NT 
Pass 
 
EAST 
Tabbush 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass
SOUTH 
Gottlieb 
1 
1NT 
3NT
J 9 3 
Q 8 7 4 3 

10 6 3
A Q 2 
J 6 
J 9 7 4 3 
J 7 2
- K 6 5 
K 10 5 2 
10 8 
A K 5 4
 
This hopeless contract went two down. South's 1NT-bid indicated that he wanted to play in NT, but it did not limit the strength of his hand. Similarly, North's 2NT apparently had no specific limit either. Nobody had any idea what the situation was. The same thing happened at the other table, except that 3NT went only down one.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------to be continued

* The Americans won by 11,110 points, and at stake was the Schwab Cup, which, from 1962 on, is the prize of the World Pair Olympiad.  This cup, originally presented to the winner of this match by Charles M. Schwab, was later donated to the World Bridge Federation by the Culbertson heirs.  return to text
** The requirements for opening 1 NT were 3 H.T., spread over at least three suits, and a 4-3-3-3-distribution. To open 2 NT, one had to hold 51/2 - 61/2 H.T., distributed over all four suits, with a stopper in each suit.  return to text

 To Part 2


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